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Three models are currently dominating the discussions in the theory of scientific explanation. first, the causal/mechanistic model which claims that an explanation consists in the identi-
fication of mechanisms understood as entities and activities organized 
such that they are productive of regular changes, from start to termi-
nation conditions (salmon, 1984, machamer et al. 2000). This is now 
the dominant approach in the social sciences (hedström and swedberg 
1996, elster 2007, demeuleneare 2011). mohamed cherkaoui has been 
one of its protagonists, his position having been best articulated in his 
Invisible Codes (2005). second, the unification approach, which claims 
that explanations are deductive arguments that provide understand-
ing by fitting particular facts and events within a general theoretical 
framework (friedman, 1974, Kitcher, 1981 and 1989, Bartelborth 2002). 
finally, the manipulationist approach, which claims that explanatory 
activity consists mainly in answering the “what-if-things-had-been-dif-
ferent-question”, i.e. it views an explanation primarily as enabling us to 
see what sort of difference it would have made for the explanandum if 
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the factors cited in the explanans had been different in various possible 
ways (Woodward 2003).
i have shown elsewhere (mantzavinos, 2013a) that these three 
approaches need not exclude one other, but they are compatible with 
each other, in the sense that each approach applies to different domains 
of science. showing this kind of compatibility paves the way for the 
defense of the position of explanatory pluralism. This is a pluralistic 
account that allows for different ideal types of explanation, i.e. different 
exemplary accounts of classification of explanatory activities.
one fruitful way to illuminate explanatory pluralism is to acknowl-
edge that at every moment of time there is a stock of explanations 
available in a society, proposed by ordinary people “in the wild” or by 
specialists organized formally or semi-formally within specific organ-
izational structures such as churches, universities, etc. This explana-
tory reservoir is distributed among diverse individuals and groups in 
society under conditions of a cognitive division of labour. The terms 
of provision, control, and dissemination of explanations in this collec-
tive explanatory enterprise are regulated by the different rules that the 
participants have come to adopt over time. These rules incorporate the 
normative standards that guide the processes of the discovery and jus-
tification of explanations as well as the modes of their communication, 
dissemination, and adoption. They constitute the rules of the explana-
tory game that the participants are playing. 
my aim in this paper is not to elaborate on the notion of an explan-
atory game, since i have done this elsewhere (mantzavinos, 2013b). my 
aim is rather to argue for the plurality of explanatory games. at every 
moment of time there is a plurality of explanatory games in a society 
that take place in parallel. in other words, it is not only within sci-
ence that different explanatory games are played, but also within society 
at large. lay people use rules of representation, rules of inference and 
rules of scope in order to provide explanations about phenomena that 
interest them. children permanently ask why-questions to their parents 
and receive responses that are aimed to satisfy their curiosity. The vast 
majority of explanations offered in a society are common-sense explana-
tions by lay people, following quite rudimentary rules in their explana-
tory activities. however, these explanations very often, though by no 
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means always, tend to change, and under appropriate circumstances 
they become more and more convincing. in other words, the explana-
tory labor is not only distributed among the different participants in 
the diverse games at a moment of time; they also evolve over time. This 
evolution takes place as the sets of rules that guide the activities of the 
explainers change over time. Thus, the broad picture is one of both a 
horizontal division of explanatory labor at a moment of time and a verti-
cal division of explanatory labor over time. The horizontal division can 
be best conceptualized as a plurality of explanatory games existing in 
parallel at a time, and the vertical division as the rule-change of these 
games over time. i will elaborate further on this in what follows.
2. The horizonTal dimension
at every moment of time there is a continuum of explanatory knowl-
edge available in a society. This knowledge is produced while diverse 
communities (broadly defined to include any group of people) proceed 
in explanatory activities. Thus, many explanatory games take place con-
currently. This is trivial, if one considers that one set of the constitutive 
rules of any explanatory game determines what counts as an explanan-
dum. human beings wish to explain a huge number of phenomena in 
their environment, so it is only natural to postulate that there, accord-
ingly, must be a huge number of games. What makes the claim of plu-
rality more interesting, however, is that the constitutive rules are also 
comprised by rules determining what must be taken as given and by 
rules determining the metaphysical presuppositions of the game. so, 
we can have explanatory games which have the same explananda, but 
differ in the rules determining what must be taken as given and/or what 
the metaphysical presuppositions are. here the plurality becomes more 
interesting, because we can identify different explanatory games that 
deal with the same explananda, but which differ from one another on 
the basis of in what they assume as given and of their metaphysical 
assumptions.
Three important types here are mythical, religious and scientific 
explanatory games. There are cases in which these three types of explan-
atory games simply deal with distinct and different explananda and, 
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thus, there is no overlap among them (consider the question of why 
angels need to have wings in order to fly). in many cases, however, these 
three types of games deal with the same explananda, but differ radically 
in what they take as given and in their metaphysical presuppositions. 
consider the case of the emergence of the universe, cosmogony. 
a prominent explanation that was produced in the framework of 
the Greek mythical explanatory game is best summarized in the follow-
ing quotation from hesiod’s Theogony (114–138).1
Tell me these things, olympian muses, tell
from the beginning, which first came to be?
chaos was first of all, but next appeared
Broad-bosomed earth, sure standing-place for all
The gods who live on snowy olympus’ peak
and misty Tartarus, in a recess
of broad-pathed earth, and love, most beautiful
of all the deathless gods. he makes men weak,
he overpowers the clever mind, and tames
The spirit in the breasts of men and gods.
from chaos came black night and erebos.
and night in turn gave birth to day and space
Whom she conceived in love to erebos.
and earth bore starry heaven, first, to be
an equal to herself, to cover her
all over, and to be a resting-place,
always secure, for all the blessed gods.
Then she brought forth long hills, the lovely homes
of goddesses, the nymphs who live among
The mountain clefts. Then, without pleasant love,
she bore the barren sea with its swollen waves,
Pontus. and then she lay with heaven, and bore
deep-whirling oceanus and Koios; then
Kreius, iapetos, hyperion,
Theia, rhea, Themis, mnemosyne,
lovely Tethys, and Phoebe, golden-crowned.
last, after these, most terrible of sons,
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The crooked-scheming Kronos came to birth
Who was his vigorous father’s enemy.
a prominent explanation of cosmogony that was produced in the 
framework of the christian explanatory game is mainly contained in 
the Book of Genesis, the first chapter of which i would like to quote at 
length:
in the beginning when God created the heavens and the earth, 
the earth was a formless void and darkness covered the face 
of the deep, while a wind from God swept over the face of 
the waters. Then God said, “let there be light”; and there was 
light. and God saw that the light was good; and God separated 
the light from the darkness. God called the light day, and the 
darkness he called night. and there was evening and there was 
morning, the first day. and God said, “let there be a dome in 
the midst of the waters, and let it separate the waters from the 
waters.” so God made the dome and separated the waters that 
were under the dome from the waters that were above the dome. 
and it was so. God called the dome sky. and there was even-
ing and there was morning, the second day. and God said, “let 
the waters under the sky be gathered together into one place, 
and let the dry land appear.” and it was so. God called the dry 
land earth, and the waters that were gathered together he called 
seas. and God saw that it was good. Then God said, “let the 
earth put forth vegetation: plants yielding seed, and fruit trees 
of every kind on earth that bear fruit with the seed in it.” and 
it was so. The earth brought forth vegetation: plants yielding 
seed of every kind, and trees of every kind bearing fruit with 
the seed in it. and God saw that it was good. and there was 
evening and there was morning, the third day. and God said, 
“let there be lights in the dome of the sky to separate the day 
from the night; and let them be for signs and for seasons and 
for days and years, and let them be lights in the dome of the 
sky to give light upon the earth.” and it was so. God made the 
two great lights—the greater light to rule the day and the lesser 
epistemolo gy of the so cial sciences
6
light to rule the night—and the stars. God set them in the dome 
of the sky to give light upon the earth, to rule over the day and 
over the night, and to separate the light from the darkness. and 
God saw that it was good. and there was evening and there was 
morning, the fourth day. 
contemporary cosmology, the branch of physics that deals with the 
question of the emergence of the universe, proposes a big bang explana-
tion. according to the general theory of relativity gravity is not a force, 
but the curvature of space time. The range of gravity is infinite since 
it is a property of space time itself and the evolution of the universe 
is ultimately dictated by gravity. a set of differential equations relates 
the dynamic quantities in the universe and turn them back in time. 
simulations on computers relate initial conditions of the universe to dif-
ferent outcomes aiming at representations of the kind of universe we live 
in. earlier astronomers, most prominently edwin hubble, observed that 
neighbouring galaxies of the milky Way galaxy are receding away—the 
more distant they are, the faster were they found to be moving away. in 
other words, recessional velocity of a galaxy increases with its distance 
from the earth. reversing this expansion scenario back in time, the 
inference is drawn that if galaxies are moving rapidly apart now, they 
must have been denser—with more matter and energy per unit vol-
ume—in the past. Going back in time, the whole universe should con-
verge to a point of infinite density and extremely high temperatures, and 
this should be the starting point of big bang. The universe itself should 
have been an infinitely dense point which expanded to its present size. 
The age of the universe according to this Big Bang explanation is esti-
mated to be 13,73 billion years.
Given that hesiod was active between 750 and 650 bc and that 
his mythical explanation has been reproduced for centuries afterwards 
and that Genesis was composed in the late 7th or the 6th century bc 
(according to the prevailing consensus of biblical scholars) the first two 
explanatory games have been unfolding in parallel for a long period of 
time. Today, nobody believes the mythical explanation of hesiod to be 
true. Today, it is the religious explanatory game of the Genesis, along 
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with the scientific explanatory game of cosmology, that are unfolding 
in parallel. (and there are other religious explanatory games that deal 
with the same explanandum, which i leave unmentioned here).
The biblical and the scientific explanatory game are structured 
around the same explanandum, but differ radically in the rules deter-
mining what must be taken as given and the rules determining their 
metaphysical presuppositions. in their everyday work, though the play-
ers of the respective games engage in their explanatory activities follow-
ing the constitutive rules of their own game, they occasionally engage 
critically with the constitutive rules of the other games. This engage-
ment is usually manifest in the rejection of what is taken as given by 
the players of the other game and a rejection of the metaphysical pre-
suppositions that they employ. The ongoing debate on creationism is 
such an example.
3. The VerTical dimension
explanatory games evolve over time. an important factor of their evo-
lution is that even the most fundamental of the constitutive rules, the 
ones that determine what counts as an explanandum, evolve over time. 
The legitimate why-questions to ask in a specific domain change over 
time, something that should not be astonishing.2
The change in the constitutive rules is certainly important, but 
the prevalent change of all other kinds of rules is of equal importance, 
making the playing of an explanatory game an inherently dynamic 
enterprise. The means of representing phenomena evolve over time—in 
contemporary science, artefacts like graphs, computer monitor displays, 
etc. are constantly developed further as are abstract means of represen-
tation like mathematical models. The same is the case with the rules of 
inference: this is what the traditional philosophy of science has focussed 
on, debating the nature of these rules, i.e. whether they are lawful, and 
if so, what their lawfulness consists in, whether they function as mere 
inference tickets from data to data or whether one should interpret them 
realistically, whether the different ontological structures require differ-
ent kinds of law-like generalizations, etc. finally, the rules of scope also 
change over time: new instructions about where and how to apply the 
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explanatory rules to new phenomena are issued, debated and followed 
by the participating scientists.
The explanations offered by the participants of an explanatory game 
evolve over time as they follow the different kinds of rules available to 
them. explanatory knowledge is just a part of general human knowl-
edge that is a product of genetic and cultural evolution. The process of 
cultural evolution concerns the change and transmission of knowledge 
in time at a societal level, and it can be regarded as a process of collec-
tive learning (mantzavinos, 2001, p.73). donald (1991), in his Origins of 
the Modern Mind, highlights the function of what he calls “external 
symbolic storage” for the transmission and accumulation of knowl-
edge across generations. it was the simple habit of recording ideas, that 
is, “of externalizing the process of oral commentary of events” (p. 342) 
that constituted the critical innovation that has massively supported 
the evolution of theoretic culture. This occurred in Greece beginning 
around 700 Bce. What was truly innovative was that “for the first time 
in history complex ideas were placed in the public arena, in an external 
medium, where they could undergo refinement over the longer term, 
that is, well beyond the life-span of single individuals” (p. 344). These 
external symbolic storage networks have decisively changed the char-
acter of knowledge evolution, since they provide the possibility of a 
constant interaction between the accumulated corpus of theoretical 
knowledge and the theoretical problems of the individuals in a society.
if one adopts an evolutionary perspective, then the thesis of a con-
tinuum between everyday, commonsensical knowledge and scientific 
knowledge, both products of the more general cultural evolutionary 
process, seems very plausible. The thesis of a continuum does not deny 
the difference in the quality of the scientific knowledge vis à vis other 
kinds of knowledge. But instead of focussing on clear-cut demarcation 
criteria of a syntactic nature (something that was fashionable for a long 
time in philosophy of science), it suggests that it is the specific way that 
knowledge is imposed for criticism that one should rather study. an 
institutional arrangement that enables criticism is the first prerequisite, 
of course. With this i mean that the institutional structure, both in its 
formal and in its informal elements, must allow or even encourage the 
criticism of knowledge structures and practices. a polity that guarantees 
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the freedom of expression and allows for resources to be devoted to the 
building of organisational structures like universities, where everything 
is allowed to be questioned, provides the formal institutional structure 
that makes advanced criticism possible. a widespread critical attitude 
towards given beliefs and practices provides the informal institutional 
structure that enable criticism. The latter is more important (and has 
in fact come first historically).3 The specific mix of formal and informal 
institutions prevailing in a society regulates the behaviour of the indi-
viduals and provides the solution to what is (very inaccurately called) 
the problem of “power”.4
in theocratic systems religious there is strong resistance to the criti-
cism of religious explanations. communist political systems have simi-
larly regularly disallowed the development of explanatory games for the 
analysis of social phenomena other than the ones that the communist 
party has found acceptable. The range and amount of criticism thus 
decisively depends on the prevailing institutional framework—the free-
dom of thought and expression that enables scientific explanatory activi-
ties in modern universities and is guaranteed by liberal states around 
the world is only a contingent historical case.
4. ePiloGue
Thus, explanatory games unfold through time in the context of spe-
cific institutional constraints, and in the broader context of an ongo-
ing evolution of all human knowledge. The rules of representation, the 
rules of inference and the rules of scope followed by the participants of 
any specific game change over time. since the ingredients of explana-
tions come from the use of these different kinds of rules, their change 
over time is concomitant with a vertical division of explanatory labor. 
The broad picture of the division of explanatory labor consists, thus, 
both of a horizontal dimension comprising all explanatory games at a 
moment of time and of a vertical dimension encapsulating all changes of 
explanatory activities taking place within the diverse games over time. 
Working out exactly how these rules change over time can not be taken 
up here. That clearly remains clearly a desideratum.
epistemolo gy of the so cial sciences
10
noTes
 1. This the translation in the Pinguin` s classics edition (1976). for a useful discus-
sion of cosmogonic myths see Burkert (1999).
 2. Thomas Kuhn (1962/1970, p. 106ff.) has drawn attention to that and van fraassen 
(1980, p.111f) has raised the issue again in the theory of explanation: “examples 
[Kuhn] gives of explanation requests which were considered legitimate in some 
periods and rejected in others cover a wide range of topics. They include the 
qualities of compounds in chemical theory (explained before lavoisier’s reform, 
and not considered something to be explained in the nineteenth century, but 
now again the subject of chemical explanation). clerk maxwell accepted as legiti-
mate the request to explain electromagnetic phenomena within mechanics. as 
his theory became more successful and more widely accepted, scientists ceased 
to see the lack of this as a shortcoming. The same had happened with newton’s 
theory of gravitation which did not (in the opinion of newton or his contempo-
raries) contain an explanation of gravitational phenomena, but only a descrip-
tion. in both cases there came a stage at which such problems were classed as 
intrinsically illegitimate, and regarded exactly as the request for an explanation 
of why a body retains its velocity in the absence of impressed forces. While all of 
this may be interpreted in various ways (such as through Kuhn’s theory of para-
digms) the important fact for the theory of explanation is that not everything 
in a theory’s domain is a legitimate topic for why-questions; and that what is, is 
not determinable a priori.)”.
 3. see Popper (1963/1989, p.50): “for the critical attitude is not so much opposed 
to the dogmatic attitude as super-imposed upon it: criticism must be directed 
against existing and influential beliefs in need of critical revision—in other 
words, dogmatic beliefs. a critical attitude needs for its raw material, as it were, 
theories of beliefs which are held more or less dogmatically. Thus science must 
begin with myths, and with the criticism of myths; neither with the collection 
of observations, nor with the invention of experiments, but with the critical dis-
cussion of myths, and of magical techniques and practices. The scientific tradi-
tion is distinguished from the pre-scientific tradition in having two layers. like 
the latter, it passes on its theories; but it also passes on a critical attitude towards 
them. The theories are passed on, not as dogmas, but rather with the challenge to 
discuss them and improve upon them. This tradition is hellenic: it may be traced 
back to Thales, founder of the first school (i do not mean ‘of the first philosophi-
cal school’, but simply ‘of the first school’) which was not mainly concerned with 
the preservation of a dogma.”
 4. i have developed my own theory of institutions which gives what i think a more 
accurate account of how “power”—indeed a very vague and thus, a useless one—
is regulated in a society. see mantzavinos (2001).
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